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PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION FROM FEDERAL STATUTES: A
STRICT STANDARD FOR IMPLICATION BY SOLE RELIANCE ON
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The implication doctrine allows a federal court to create a private cause
of action from a federal statute that does not expressly provide for a private
remedy. In Cort v. Ash, ' the Supreme Court articulated a four factor test
to determine when this doctrine should be utilized. This comment will
provide a brief history of the implication doctrine and of the major Supreme Court decisions that culminated in the Cort test. 2 Relevant Supreme Court decisions after Cort, will then be examined to reveal a new,
more restrictive approach to implication. Finally, reasons will be advanced
that justify this stricter approach.
II.

HISTORY OF THE IMPLICATION DoCmINE THROUGH

Cort v. Ash

"The origin of implied private causes of actions in the federal courts is
said to date back to Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby." 3 In holding that a
private action may lie for a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act,'
the Supreme Court reasoned that "[a] disregard of the command of the
statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class
for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the
damages from the party in default is implied. .

.

."I

Since virtually every

federal regulatory statute is enacted to protect special classes of persons,
the Rigsby approach could justify implied private actions for nearly every
penal statute.' A more complex and scrutinizing approach was needed.
1. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
2. For a detailed discussion of the implication doctrine prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Cort, see Comment, Private Rights of Action UnderAmtrak and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1392 (1975).
3. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1975 (1979). The principle of judicially
implied causes of action can be traced to the common law. In Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep.
1193 (K.B. 1854), a violation of a criminal statute requiring a shipowner to maintain a supply
of medicines on board a vessel was found to give rise to a cause of action to a sailor who
suffered personal injury from the breach of that statute.
4. Act of April 14, 1910, ch. 160, §§ 1-6, 36 Stat. 298, as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 11-16
(1976). Specifically, plaintiff's suit alleged violation of § 2 of the Act, requiring secure handholds on all railroad cars equipped with ladders. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 37
(1916).
5. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
6. See, e.g., Comment, Implied Private Rights of Action-The Cort v. Ash
Test-Interactionof "EspecialBeneficiary" and Legislative Intent, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1173,
1174 (1978). But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1976 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that "[t]he practice of judicial reference to legisla-
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The necessity of narrowing the test for implication frequently caused the
.Supreme Court to refuse to imply private causes of action from federal
statutes.' Even when the statute was arguably for the benefit of a special
class comprising the plaintiff, the Court refused to imply a private action
if Congress specified other means of enforcing such duties.' However, a
break in this pattern of restrictiveness occurred in the Court's decision of
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.5 Finding an implied cause of action under section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1o the Court held that private
actions could be implied as a "necessary supplement" to a Congresscreated mechanism for enforcing the statute." This is because "it is the
duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose."' 2 The language suggests that
implication provides those actions which Congress could not anticipate as
necessary for its purposes, rather than those which Congress intended, but
for which it did not specifically provide.'" Borak came to represent a liberal
application of the implication doctrine, one in which the judiciary's role
was active and unrestrained by legislative authority, though justified by
basic legislative policy.'
The Court's 1974 decision of National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Natively determined standards of care was a common expedient to establish negligence ....
Rigsby did nothing more than follow this practice and cannot be taken as authority for the
judicial creation of a cause of action not legislated by Congress." Id.
7. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,
359 U.S. 464 (1959); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246
(1951); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943). In all these cases,
the Court focused primarily on the availability of means other than a private action to enforce
the statutory duty at issue.
8. See Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1943).
9. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78 n(a) (1976). Specifically, the Court granted a private cause of action to
a stockholder alleging corporate use of false statements in proxy solicitation materials which
violated § 14(a) of the Act.
11. 377 U.S. at 432.
12. Id. at 433.
13. See 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 447, 451 (1976).
14. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (allowing a private action for
enforcement of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1976)); Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (allowing a private action under the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970)). But see Cannon v. University of Chicago,
99 S. Ct. 1946, 1977-79 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that Borak did
not signal the start of a trend in the Court, but represented a singular and aberrant interpretation of a federal statute. Further, Justice Powell went on to state that since Borak, the Court
has upheld private causes of actions under very limited circumstances. For example, the
decision in Allen v. State Bd. of Elections can be explained only "in terms of this Court's
special and traditional concern for safeguarding the electoral process." Id. at 1978-79.
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tional Association of RailroadPassengers5 (Amtrak) has been interpreted
-as a warning to lower federal courts to decelerate their reliance on Borak
in implying private actions. 8 In Amtrak, the Court denied a private action
to challenge violations of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970,'1 in light
of the Attorney General's express enforcement authority. 8 The issue of
implication ceased to be merely whether a private action would further a
congressional purpose. Instead, the Court addressed the issue as "whether
such a private cause of action can be maintained in light of [an enforcement provision in the Act]."'" By applying the maxim, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius," the Court indicated that where an adequate remedy is
provided in the statute, there is a presumption against implication. 2' Such
a presumption can only be rebutted by showing "clear contrary evidence
of legislative intent."
15. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
16. See, e.g., De Rieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974);
Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting); Fawvor v. Texaco,
Inc., 387 F. Supp. 626, 629 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Ferland v. Orange Groves, Inc., 377 F. Supp.
690, 706-07 (M.D. Fla. 1974); see Note, Remedies-PrivateRight of ActionNot To Be Implied
from Federal CorruptPracticesAct, 50 TuL. L. Rxv. 713, 716 (1976); 12 Hous. L. REV. 211,
216-17 (1974).
17. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1976).
18. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S.
453, 457 (1974).
19. Id. at 455.
20. Id. at 458. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW
DicnoNARY 591 (5th ed. 1979).
21. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458
(1974). See Note, Implication of PrivateActions from FederalStatutes: From Borak to Ash,
1 J. CoRP. L. 371, 381 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Implication of Private Actions]. This
presumption against implication expressed the general reluctance of the federal judiciary to
invade the regulatory domain of another branch of government. Thus, where adequate remedial powers were vested in a federal officer or agency, private remedies were often denied.
See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974)
(private suit under Amtrak Act vested in the Attorney General); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co.,
483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973) (remedial power for violation of Federal Trade Commission Act
vested in F.T.C.); Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur County, Ga., 482 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.
1973) (enforcement of Bridge Act vested in the Attorney General). See generally Note,
Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285, 294-96
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Implied Civil Remedies]. Similarly, where comprehensive enforcement schemes were provided, private remedies were often denied. See, e.g., Jeter v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 507 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1975) (enforcement provisions of Occupational
Safety and Health Act sufficiently comprehensive to negate the need for a private cause of
action); accord Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974). See also note 8 supra and
accompanying text.
22. National R.R. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
Since the legislative history showed a congressional committee had considered private remedies and failed to adopt them, the Court concluded that the remedies provided were exclusive.
In addition, since one of the purposes of the Act was to eliminate uneconomical routes without
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That Amtrak signalled a more restrictive approach to implication was
confirmed in Securities Investor ProtectionCorp. v. Barbour.3 Again, the
Court applied the familiar considerations of legislative intent, 4 congressional purpose,25 and the adequacy of statutory remedies 2 to deny a private
action under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.2 In Barbour,
the Court found "[a s in Amtrak, a private right of action under the
[Act] would be consistent neither with the legislative intent, nor with the
effectuation of the purposes it [was] intended to serve. 28 This seemingly
ad hoc approach by the Supreme Court failed to provide a clear standard
2
and resulted in diverse treatment of the implied remedy question. 1
It was in this atmosphere of invariable refusal to imply private remedies,
absent legislative intent, that the Court decided Cort v. Ash.2 The issue
was whether a corporate stockholder had been accorded a private cause of
action for derivative relief against corporate directors for a violation of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 3' In denying such a cause of action, the Court announced
a four factor test to determine when a private cause of action may be
implied in a federal statute not explicitly authorizing one:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted," . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? .. .Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . .And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
States, so that it would
32
solely on federal law?
the expense and delay of litigation, a private action was not necessary to achieve this goal.
Id. at 463-64.
23. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
24. Id. at 418-20.
25. Id. at 421.
26. Id. at 425.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff (1976). Specifically, customers of failing brokers are not entitled to
an implied cause of action under this Act.
28. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 424 (1975).
29. See 47 Miss. L. J. 156, 162, n. 60 (1976).
30. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 610, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. II 1972) (repealed 1976). The Act
is a criminal statute which prohibits corporations from making campaign contributions in
elections where the offices of President and Vice President are concerned.
32. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (emphasis in original), quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 k1916) (citations omitted). For a more detailed discussion of Cort and
how each factor was applied, see Implication of Private Actions, supra note 21, at 382-88;
Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for

1980]

609

PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION

The Cort test contained many familiar principles. Yet, because the
Court applied each criterion very rigidly and maintained a presumption
against implication,3 commentators have agreed that the Cort test indicated a severely restrictive approach designed to further reduce the implication of private remedies. 3 While each Cort factor is "relevant, ' 33 the
difficult question as to how these factors are to be applied remains. An
examination of subsequent decisions in which the Court had an opportunity to apply the Cort test demonstrates the importance of clear congressional intent as a demanding and vital factor for the implication of a
private remedy. 6 These decisions will be discussed in the following section.
Im.

ANALYSIS OF "IMPLICATION"

CASES AFrER

Cort v. Ash

The first decision after Cort in which the Supreme Court dealt with an
implied private cause of action was Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.11 Ernst
and Ernst, an accounting firm, periodically audited a brokerage firm that
had sold its customers on a fraudulent investment scheme." The customers
of the brokerage firm sought to sue Ernst & Ernst under section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 193431 and the Exchange Commission
Rule 10b-5 for its failure to conduct proper audits.
The Court recognized that "the existence of a private cause of action for
violations of the statute and the Rule. . .[was] well established."' Here,
however, the Court ruled that no private action would lie under section
Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1412-26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private Rights of
Action Under Amtrak].
33. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80-85 (1975).
34. Implication of Private Actions, supra note 21, at 383; 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 447, 457
(1976); 47 Miss. L.J. 156, 163 (1976).
35. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
36. For an argument that the Cort decision meant to "de-emphasize the importance of
legislative intent," see Comment, Implied Private Rights of Action-The Cort v. Ash
Test-Interactionof "EspecialBeneficiary" and Legislative Intent, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1173,
1179, 1181-82 (1978).
37. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
38. Id. at 189-90.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). This section makes it unlawful to use or employ any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance when in contravention of Securities and Exchange
Commission Rules.
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979). This section prohibits any artifice to defraud or any act
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with
buying or selling securities.
41. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
But see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) which is discussed at note 46,
infra.

610

UNIVERSITY

OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:605

10(b) or rule 10b-5 in the absence of intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud." The significance of this case lies not so much in its holding, as
in its rationale. Justice Powell, delivering the majority opinion, stated that
ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to a judicially implied
liability must rely primarily on the language of a statutory section or Act.,
Such language, in fact, must be the starting point." The next step is to
examine the legislative history of the statute or Act to find further evidence
of congressional intent. 5 This reasoning suggests that in the absence of any
specific statutory language or legislative history that demonstrates congressional intent to provide a private remedy, the Court will be reluctant
to imply such a remedy."
Failing to mention the Cort analysis in Ernst & Ernst,7 the Court first
4
applied Cort in Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries.
" The respondent in this
case, Chris-Craft, was the unsuccessful tender offeror in a contest for the
takeover of another corporation."9 Chris-Craft sued for damages and injunctive relief against the target corporation, its investment advisor and
the successful competitor, alleging violations of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1o This section makes unlawful "any fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in connection with any tender
offer. . . or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor
42. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). The case was not remanded for
further proceedings to require proof of fraud, deception or manipulation since, throughout the
history of the case, respondent customers proceeded on a theory of liability premised on
negligence. In fact, respondents specifically disclaimed that Ernst & Ernst had engaged in
fraud or any intentional misconduct. Id. at 215.
43. Id. at 200.
44. Id. at 197. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring) ("[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself"); F.T.C. v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941).
45. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976).
46. Id. at 214 ("[w]hen a statute speaks so specifically . . . and when its history reflects
no more expansive intent, [the Court is] quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute
.
...
"). See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), where the Court denied a
private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to respondent stockholders who
alleged fraud in a merger action with a Delaware corporation. Citing Ernst & Ernst, the Court
said that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, [the Court would be] reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities." Id. at 479.
47. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Apparently, the Court in Ernst & Ernst felt that since "the
language of §10(b) so clearly connotes intentional misconduct" the Cort analysis would not
be necessary to divine congressional intent. "[Because] the language of a statute controls
when sufficiently clear in its context, further inquiry may be unnecessary." Id. at 201 (citations omitted).
48. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
49. Id. at 4-10.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)(1976).
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of such offer, request, or invitation." 5' The Court held that a defeated
tender-offeror had no implied cause of action under section 14(e).52 Chief
Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion, stated that "[the] analysis
begins, of course, with the statute itself. 5 3 Since the statute neither denied
nor implied a private cause of action, the analysis shifted to legislative
history to help determine the intent of Congress.54 Warning that any reliance on legislative history must be dealt with "cautiously, '55 the Court
found no evidence that Congress intended to create a private remedy for a
defeated tender offeror under section 14(e).56
Only after the first analysis in Piper did the Court apply the four factors
of the Cort test to confirm its conclusion as to legislative history. 7 The
Court's reliance on the initial analysis indicates that while the Cort factors
are still "relevant," each factor is not necessarily essential, nor deserving
of equal consideration. This is because each Cort factor actually addresses
the question of whether Congress intended to create a private cause of
action.55 Thus, when legislative intent is determinable by statutory language or legislative history, it becomes unnecessary to apply any other Cort
factor. 0
The Court reiterated its reliance on legislative intent in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez.' Respondent, a female member of the Santa Clara
51. Id.
52. 430 U.S. at 47.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Id. at 26. In connection with legislative history, the Court mentioned congressional
purpose and effectuation of congressional goals, but these factors were considered only for
determining legislative intent. Id. at 25-26. See note 59 infra, and accompanying text.
55. 430 U.S. at 26. Specifically, the Chief Justice warned that "[w]e must be wary against
interpolating our notions of policy in the interstices of legislative provisions." Id., quoting
Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942). See text accompanying notes 124-44,

infra.
56. 430 U.S. at 35.
57. Id. at 37-41.
58. 422 U.S. at 78.
59. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946,1980 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("[Tihese [Cort] factors were meant only as guideposts for answering a single question,
namely whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action."); see also National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Crawford &
Schneider, The Implied Private Cause of Action and the FederalAviation Act: A Practical
Application of Cort v. Ash, 23 VmL. L. Rav. 657, 674-75 (1978).
The fourth Cort factor also seems related to the question of whether the Court should, as a
matter of policy, imply a private cause of action. An answer to this question is implicit in
the facts that the courts are already overburdened with litigation and that their jurisdiction
is limited to that created by statute. See text accompanying notes 124-44, infra.
60. See note 104 infra, and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems of interpreting legislative history, see PrivateRights ofAction underAmtrak, supra note 32, at 1412.
61. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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Pueblo Indian tribe, brought suit against the tribe, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against enforcement of a tribal ordinance that denied
tribal membership to children of female members who marry outside the
tribe, but not to similarly situated men of the tribe. 2 The respondent
claimed that such an ordinance is violative of Title I of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968.63 The relevant part of the statute provides that "[n]o
Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall. . . deny to any
."I,
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws ...
In Martinez, the Court's majority, speaking through Justice Marshall,
held that the Act could not be interpreted as implying a private cause of
action against a tribe or its officers in the federal courts." Finding no
private remedy expressly authorized by the statute," the Court examined
the legislative history and concluded that "it is highly unlikely that Congress would have intended a private cause of action. . . ."I' Even though
there was no doubt that the respondent was among the class to be especially benefited from this legislation, 8 the strength of legislative intent
determined by legislative history and statutory construction proved to be
of overriding consideration. Martinez is especially noteworthy because it
represented a deviation from the Court's pattern of implying a cause of
action where a statute explicitly conferred a right directly on a class of
persons that included the plaintiff in the case."
62. Id. at 51.
63. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1977).
64. Id. at § 1302(8).
65. 436 U.S. at 69 (1978).
66. Id. at 59.
67. Id. at 69.
68. Id. at 61. See 422 U.S. at 78.
69. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) (42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1977): "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof .... "); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-55, (1969) (42
); Jones v.
U.S.C. § 1973c (1977): "[N]o person shall be denied the right to vote ....
Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414-15 (1968) (same as in Sullivan, supra); Turnstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944) Fourth Railway
Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1977). "Employees shall have the right to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives ....

"); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.

33, 39 (1916), (Act of June 17, 1910, Pub. L. No. 214, 36 Stat. 298: "any employee of any
common carrier ....

"). That Martinez deviated from this pattern is obvious. However,

Martinez can be distinguished since it involved an attempt to imply a private cause of action
in a virtually unique situation, i.e., against an Indian tribe. Traditionally, Indian tribes have
been protected by a strong presumption of autonomy and self-government and by a legislative
history indicative of an intent to limit severely judicial interference in tribal affairs. See
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55, 58-59, 63-64, 67-70, 72. Even Martinez, however, "recognized the
propriety of inferring a federal cause of action for the enforcement of civil rights, even when
Congress has spoken in purely declarative terms." Id. at 61. Thus, Martinez alone can not
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In Chrysler Corporation v. Brown,7" the Court continued its trend of
denying implied remedies. This decision primarily involved a criminal
statute entitled the Trade Secrets Act.' This Act imposes criminal sanctions on government employees who disclose to any extent not authorized2
by law, certain classified information submitted to a government agency.
Chrysler, a government contractor, sued under this Act to prevent disclosure of information supplied to the Defense Logistics Agency concerning
Chrysler's employment of women and minorities. 3 The Court rejected
Chrysler's contention that the Act afforded a private cause of action to
enjoin disclosure in violation of the statute.7 Citing Cort in the opinion,
Justice Rehnquist stated that a review of legislative history revealed no
legislative intent to create a private cause of action. 5 Justice Rehnquist
further stated, "a private right of action is not 'necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose.' "76 The Court's reliance on the second and third
factors of the Cort test helps confirm the idea that it is not necessary to
consider all four Cort factors." Rather, a determination of congressional
be construed to mean that the Court will no longer create a private remedy when Congress
expressly grants a right to a person of a specified class. See Cannon v. University of Chicago,
99 S. Ct. 1946, 1967-69 (1979) (allowing a private remedy under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972).
While the Court has granted private actions in statutes that confer a federal right on a
plaintiff, the Court has been especially reluctant to imply causes of actions under statutes
that create duties on the part of persons for the beriefit of the public at large. See 430 U.S. 1
("unlawful conduct"); 422 U.S. 66 ("unlawful conduct"); Securities Investor Protection Corp.
v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (duty of SIPC to "discharge obligations"); National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (forbidding
"action, practice or policy inconsistent" with the Act); Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647
(1963) (setting procedure for procuring congressional subpoena); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United
States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) ("duty of every common carrier ... to establish ... just and
reasonable rates . . . ."); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341
U.S. 246 (1951) (similar duty of gas pipeline companies). But see 377 U.S. 426 (implying a
cause of action under a securities provision describing "unlawful conduct").
70. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1977).
72. 441 U.S. at 294-95.
73. Id. at 286. Chrysler also tried to base its suit for injunctive relief on the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FOIA], which stated that the
FOIA would not apply to trade secrets or confidential commercial information obtained from
a person. The Court held that the FOIA was exclusively a disclosure statute and afforded
petitioner no private right of action to enjoin agency disclosure. The language, logic and
history of the FOIA showed that its exemption provisions were meant only to permit the
agency to withhold certain information, and were not mandatory bars to disclosure. Id. at
292.
74. Id. at 316.
75. Id.
76, Id. at 317 (quoting 377 U.S. at 433).
77. See note 59 supra, and accompanying text.
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intent at the time Congress considered the statute is not only necessary,
but controlling.
Chrysler also supports the general notion that the Court will rarely imply
a private cause of action under a criminal statute78 and where it does so
"there [is] at least a statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of
action of some sort lay in favor of someone.""
A break in the Court's pattern of consistently refusing to create private
actions" occurred in Cannon v. University of Chicago.8 The Court's majority, speaking through Justice Stevens, held that a female, who was denied
admission to medical school at two private universities, had an implied
right under Title IX82 of the Education Amendments of 1972 to pursue a
private remedy. 3 The relevant section, 1681(a), provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance. . . ."" Citing Cort, the opinion recognized that "the fact that
a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not
automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person." Yet, the Court did say that before deciding whether Congress intended to afford a remedy to a special class of litigants, a court "must
carefully analyze the four [Cort] factors .
,,"I The Court then proceeded systematically to apply each Cort factor and found that each factor
was satisfied.87 Nonetheless, this mandate of strictly applying each factor
of the Cort test seems inconsistent with the Court's recent application of
the test." Such an extreme position may best be read in light of the fact
that during the period of enactment of several titles of the Civil Rights Act,
the Supreme Court had consistently found implied remedies.88 Concerned,
89. In the decade preceding the enactment of Title IX, the Court decided six impliedcause-of-action cases. In all of them a cause of action was found. See Superintendent of Insur.
v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
78. See 422 U.S. 66; Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
79. 441 U.S. at 316, quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975); see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
80. See 441 U.S. 281; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 46 (1978); 430 U.S. 1; Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
81. 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1977).
83. 99 S. Ct. at 1968.
84. Id. at 1949-50.
85. Id. at 1953. See 422 U.S. 66.
86. 99 S. Ct. at 1953 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1953-64.
88. See 441 U.S. 281; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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perhaps, that Congress had come to rely on the courts to decide issues of
private remedies, a finding that each Cort factor was satisfied may have
been the Court's way to justify creation of this private cause of action in
Cannon.
Cannon, despite its reliance on Cort, signalled a more restrictive approach to implication. While Justice Stevens stated only that it was preferable for legislative intent to be manifested in the specific language of a
statute,"0 a concurring opinion by Justice Rehnquist warned that the Court
in the future would be "extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action
absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.""1 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Powell even called for a rejection of the Cort analysis92 and argued that no private action should be implied absent the most
compelling evidence of legislative intent.
The stricter approach to implication suggested by Justice Rehnquist in
Cannon was embraced by the Court in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.14
Touche Ross, an accounting firm, was hired by a securities brokerage firm
(Weis) to audit Weis' books and file financial reports with the Securities
and Exchange Commission as required by section 17(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.15 Due to a poor financial condition, Weis underwent
U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). But cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 379 (1978) (separate opinion of White, J.). In Bakke, Justice White argued that the
legislative history, like the terms of the Act itself, clearly showed that Congress did not intend
for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, to provide a private cause of
action. However, the other Justices refused to resolve this difficult issue in Bakke and it was
assumed for purposes of the case. 438 U.S. at 283.
90. 99 S. Ct. at 1967.
91. Id. at 1968 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1975 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that the Cort analysis leads
to judicial legislation. See note 138 infra, and accompanying text.
93. Justice Powell stated:
Henceforth, we should not condone the implication of any private action from a
federal statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended
such an action to exist. Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alternate
mechanism for enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be especially reluctant
ever to permit a federal court to volunteer its services for enforcement purposes.
99 S.Ct. at 1985.
94. 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976). The relevant section reads as follows:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof. . . and every broker or
dealer registered pursuant to . . .this title, shall make, keep and preserve for such
periods, such accounts, correspondence. . . and other records, and make such reports,
as the Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
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liquidation, but was unable to reimburse the customers who had left assets
or deposits with the firm." These customers sought to impose liability
against Touche Ross for its allegedly improper auditing of Weis' financial
statement. 7 Thus, the issue became whether customers of a securities
brokerage firm, required to file financial statements under section 17(a),
had an implied cause of action against accountants who failed to audit
properly a now bankrupt broker.
In holding that section 17(a) did not create a private cause of action in
anyone," the Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, expressly refused
to apply each of the four Cort factors. 9 The Court's task was "limited
solely to determining whether Congress intended to create [a] private
right of action .

. . ."10

To ascertain this intent, the Court's analysis

began with the language of the statute itself. °1 Finding nothing in the
language implying a cause of action in anyone,102 the Court then examined
legislative history and also found it silent on the issue of private remedies.1 3 When it was determined on the basis of statutory language and
legislative history that Congress did not intend to create, either expressly
or implicitly, a private cause of action, the Court stated that further inquiries were of "little relevance". 0 ' In such circumstances, the Court held
that if there is to be a federal remedy, Congress has to provide it.1 5

The Court's next implication case was TransamericaMortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis.' Respondent, a shareholder of Mortgage Trust of America
96. 99 S.Ct. at 2483.
97. Id. at 2484.
98. Id. at 2491.
99. Id. at 2489. The Court in Touche Ross acknowledged that the Cort decision did not
determine what weight to give to the four factors. Id. Justice Brennan, concurring in Touche
Ross, added that if the first two factors of Cort are not satisfied, the remaining two factors
by themselves cannot be the basis for implying a cause of action. Id. at 2491 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
100. Id. at 2485.
101. Id. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
102. 99 S.Ct. at 2485. The Court strongly indicated that if a statute neither prohibited
certain conduct nor created federal rights in favor of private parties, the Court would rarely
imply a private cause of action. Id. at 2485-86.
103. Id. at 2486. The Court stated here that "implying a private right of action on the basis
of congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best." Id. See text beginning at note 124,
infra.
104. Id. at 2489. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1968 (1979) (White,
J., dissenting) ("[If] the legislative history and statutory scheme show that Congress intended not to provide a new private cause of action, .

.

. such intent is controlling.

.. ").

105. 99 S.Ct. at 2490. "[lit is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area."
Id. at 2490-91, quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963). See note 103, supra.
106. 48 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1979).
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(Trust), alleged that Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 0 the Trust's
investment adviser, had been guilty of various frauds in violation of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Act).' The complaint sought injunctive
relief to restrain further performance of the advisory contract, rescission
of the contract and restitution under section 215."11 In addition, the complaint sought an award for damages under section 206."11 Since "the Act
nowhere expressly provides a private action,""' the issue before the Court
was whether a private cause of action could be implied from either of these
two sections of the Act.
The Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, prefaced the decision by
stating that the Touche Ross standard would apply."' Thus, in order to
determine congressional intent, the Court examined the legislative history
of the Act and found it silent on the question of private remedies., The
Court also looked to the language of the two sections of the Act. Concerning
section 215,"' the Court concluded that the statutory language itself implied a private cause of action for certain limited relief in the federal
courts."' The Court reasoned that since section 215 declares that certain
107. Also named as defendants in the case were Mortgage Trust of America, several individual trustees and two corporations affiliated with TAMA, Land Capital, Inc. and Transamerica Corporation, all of which Wvere petitioners in the case. Id.
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-i to -21 (1976).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(1976). The relevant part of § 215 provides that any contract whose
formation or performance would violate the Act "shall be void. . . as regards the rights of
the violator and knowing successors in interest."
110. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). The relevant part of § 206 broadly proscribes fraudulent
practices by investment advisers, making it unlawful for any investment adviser "to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . [or] to engage in any transaction, practice,
or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective
client," or to engage in specified transactions with clients without making required disclosures.
111. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4002.
112. While some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the
desirability of implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought
to effectuate the purposes of a given statute, e.g., J. I. Case v. Borak. . .what must
ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy
asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear. Touche Ross v. Redington. . . . We
accept this as the appropriate inquiry to be made in resolving the issues presented by
the case before us.
Id. See note 100 infra, and accompanying text.
113. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4003. While a silent legislative history may not be helpful to a person
seeking a private remedy, it does not necessarily preclude courts from implying one. As
Justice Stewart stated, "the failure of Congress expressly to consider a private remedy is not
inevitably inconsistent with an intent on its part to make such a remedy available. . . .Such
an intent may appear implicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its enactment." Id.
114. See note 109 supra.
115. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4003.
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contracts are void, Congress necessarily intended that "the customary
legal incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit
for rescission or for an injunction against continued operation of the contract, and for restitution.""' As for respondent's claim for monetary relief,
the Court held that section 206 does not create a private cause of action.
In noting that section 215, unlike section 206,"11 only "proscribes certain
8
conduct, and does not in terms create or alter any civil liabilities," the
Court acknowledged the basic rule of statutory construction that "where
a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must
be chary of reading others into it."" 9 Thus, in view of Congress providing
both judicial and administrative means for enforcing section 206,120 the
possible to imply the existence of a private
Court concluded that it was not
2
'
damages.
for
action
of
cause
Touche Ross cannot be viewed as a total rejection of the Cort test.
'
Indeed, the Cort factors are still "relevant."' However, these factors are
116. Id. It can be argued that Congress only intended § 215 to be raised as a defense in
private litigation merely to prevent the enforcement of an investment adviser's contract.
However, the Court broadened this approach since it felt the legal consequences of voidness
were not meant to be so limited. Id. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282,
289 (1940); 12 WILLISTON, CONTRAMCS § 1525 (Jaeger 3d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1973).
117. See note 110 supra.
118. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4003.
119. Id. See notes 20-21 supra, and accompanying text.
120. First, under § 217 willful violations of the Act are criminal offenses, punishable
by fine or imprisonment, or both. Second, § 209 authorizes the Commission to bring
civil actions in federal courts to enjoin compliance with the Act, including, of course,
§ 206. Third, the Commission is authorized by § 203 to impose various administrative
sanctions on persons who violate the Act, including § 206.
48 U.S.L.W. at 4003.
121. Id. There also existed circumstantial evidence to support the Court's decision not to
imply a private action under § 206. The Court found that under each of the securities laws
that preceded the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and under the Investment Company Act,
Congress expressly allowed for private actions for damages in certain circumstances. "The
fact that [Congress] enacted no analogous provisions in the legislation here at issue strongly
suggests that Congress was simply unwilling to impose any potential monetary liability to a
private suitor." Id. at 4004.
The Court went on to reject the respondent's contention that the Court's inquiry could not
stop with congressional intent, but must consider the utility of a private action and that such
an action may not be traditionally relegated to state law. Id. The Court also stated that even
though § 206 was designed to protect adviser's clients, such as the respondent, from the
fraudulent practices it prohibited, this was not sufficient to require implication of a private
action. Following Touche Ross, the Court stated that "[tihe dispositive question remains
whether Congress intended to create any such [private] remedy. Having answered that
question in the negative, our inquiry is at an end." Id. But see id. at 4005-08 (White, J.,
dissenting), where each of the four Cort factors was found to point toward implication of a
private action under sections 215 and 206.
122. 99 S. Ct. at 2489, quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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relevant only to the extent they serve as aids in ascertaining clear legislative intent.'2 Touche Ross demonstrates that such intent should be determined primarily by examination of the statutory language and legislative
history. Such an emphasis on clear legislative intent is a stricter approach
to implication than used in Cort. However, this next section will show that
it is the correct approach.
IV.

STRICT RELIANCE ON LEGISLATIVE INTENT: FOR BETTER OR WORSE?

It has been argued that a strict standard for implication defeats the
legitimate purpose for which the implication doctrine was created.24 This
purpose, basically, is to prevent the frustration of congressional goals.', If
a statutory enforcement scheme proves inadequate in achieving such goals,
the federal courts have a duty to supplement the express remedy with an
implied remedy. 28 This view of the courts' role is apparently based on an
assumption that when Congress enacts a regulatory statute designed to
protect a certain class, it intends to create an enforcement scheme to fully
protect that class. 12 Thus, by creating implied remedies, the courts are
merely helping to effectuate congressional policy.12 If implication is
utilized only when legislative intent is clear, the criticism is that congressional policy will be frustrated.
Yet, despite such criticism, the Supreme Court's strict approach of sole
reliance on clear legislative intent as applied in Touche Ross is proper. One
argument supporting this approach is grounded upon the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers. When Congress decides not to provide a
private remedy, federal courts should not assume a legislative role, thereby
expanding their jurisdiction."' Implication under a less rigid standard than
123. See note 59, supra.

124. Implicationof PrivateActions, supranote 21, at 376; Private Rights of Actions Under
Amtrak, supra note 32, at 1413; 25 CAm. U. L. REv. 447, 457 (1976).
125. See

J.I.

Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964); Implying Civil Remedies,

supra note 21, at 291; Private Rights of Actions Under Amtrak, supra note 32, at 1393.
126. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1945)
("[w]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that the courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief");
see, Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and Discretion in the Choice
of National and State Rules for Decisions, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 n.30 (1957).
127. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967); J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964).
128. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).

129. See 99 S. Ct. at 2490; 99 S. Ct. at 1975 (Powell, J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,411-12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963). See also United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313-16 (1947). InBivens, the majority held that a private cause of action
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applied in Touche Ross also means delegating legislative functions to a
branch of government ill-equipped to decide legislative issues properly.'30
As Chief Justice Burger stated, "Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task-as we do
not.'

31

It has been suggested that Congress tends to rely on the courts to imply
remedies, rather than determining the question for itself.' 3 However, it
does not follow that the Supreme Court should continue to indulge Congress in its refusal to address this issue of implied remedies. If federal
courts were to rely on a standard other than clear legislative intent, it
would encourage Congress to avoid its constitutional obligation by leaving
hard political choices for the courts to decide.'1 Courts should not be free
to reach decisions concerning implied remedies without regard to what the
normal play of political factors would have produced because: (1) intended
beneficiaries of the legislation are not ensured of obtaining remedies adequate to meet their needs; 3 (2) those subject to legislative restraints are
denied the chance to "forestall through the political process potentially
unnecessary and disruptive litigation;"'35 and (3) the public is generally
denied the benefits derived from resolving important social issues "through
' 36
the open debate of the democratic process." '
In the years since Cort, there have been numerous decisions in which
3
courts of appeals have implied private actions from federal statutes. It
could be implied directly from the Constitution to remedy fourth amendment violations. The
basic distinction between Bivens and other implication cases may be found in the Court's
traditional concern for the preservation of an individual's constitutional rights. For a discussion of Bivens and the implication of other constitutional rights, see Comment, Bivens Actions for Equal Protection Violations: Davis v. Passman, 92 HARv. L. REv. 745 (1979).
130. 99 S.Ct. at 1975 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[An implied remedy] is not a question
properly to be decided by relatively uninformed federal judges who are isolated from the
political process."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 411-12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 412
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
132. 99 S.Ct. at 1968 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 1981 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dangers posed by the judiciary resolving social
and political conflicts have been evident to the Court throughout its history. See Schlesinger
v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 432
(1948); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718
(1878) ("One branch of government cannot encroach on the domain of another without
danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of
this salutary rule.").
134. 99 S.Ct. at 1982 (Powell, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978) ( § 17(a) of
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is unreasonable to assume that Congress simply forgot to mention an intended private action in each of these statutes. These decisions indicate
that Cort not only invites judicial legislation,'38 but also leads the courts
to apply diverse standards for implication.' 9 The new standard of examining statutory language and legislative history to ascertain legislative intent
will halt this accelerating trend and provide a uniform standard leading
to decisions more consistent with constitutional principles.
Another argument supporting the strict standard articulated in Touche
Ross involves the scarcity of judicial resources. The federal courts are
already overburdened and the liberal use of each Cort factor for implication will aggravate this situation further.4 0 As Justice Blackmun stated,
an implied cause of action "opens the door for another avalanche of new
federal cases."'"' Reliance on legislative intent as determined in Touche
Ross will promote jadicial restraint and alleviate some of the courts' burden. Further, this policy of judicial restraint and deference to Congress will
not result in abandonment of injured plaintiffs because Congress is at
liberty to make changes in an inadequate federal statute.4 ' It has been
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Local 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland
Transit Dist., 589 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1978) ( § 13(c) of Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964);
Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978) ( § 1007(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958); Riggle v. California, 577 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1978) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1906); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 568
F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1977) ( § 11(e) of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act); United Handicapped
Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) ( § 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); McDaniel
v. Univ. of Chicago, 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977) ( § 1 of Davis-Bacon Act); Hughes v.
Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1976) (§ 6 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
For exhaustive citations, see 99 S. Ct. at 1980-81 (Powell, J., dissenting).
138. In Cannon, Justice Powell eloquently stated reasons why the Cort factors, other than
the one referring expressly to legislative intent, encourage judicial lawmaking:
Asking whether a statute creates a right in favor of a private party, for example, begs
the question at issue. What is involved is not the mere existence of a legal right, but a
particular person's right to invoke the power of the courts to enforce that right. Determining whether a private action would be consistent with the "underlying purposes"
of a legislative scheme permits a court to decide for itself what the goals of a scheme
should be, and how those goals should be advanced. Finally, looking to state law for
parallels to the federal right simply focuses inquiry on a particular policy consideration
that Congress already may have weighted in deciding not to create a private action.
99 S. Ct. at 1980 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted).
139. Compare Local 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist.,
589 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) with Network Project v. Corp. for Pub. Broadcasting, 561 F.2d 963
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
140. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
428 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Judd, The Expanding Jurisdictionof the Federal
Courts, 60 A.B.A.J. 938, 938-41 (1974).
141. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 430
(1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. Justice Rehnquist recognized in Touche Ross that Congress is obviously capable of
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argued that congressional corrections do nothing to protect plaintiffs who
are injured before Congress can amend the deficient statute.' However,
the reverse is true in that congressional corrections will not protect a wary
defendant already convicted under an implied cause of action. Therefore,
as a matter of fairness, the intent of Congress should always control.
Since it is the duty of Congress to legislate, 4 ' it is incumbent upon them
to make its intentions clear. Congress can best achieve this by including
a specific provision in the statute stating who is entitled to a private
remedy. Absent a specific provision or a strong legislative history showing
congressional intent to create a private remedy, the courts should not
imply one.
V.

CONCLUSION

The implication doctrine is firmly entrenched in our federal judicial
system. However, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have constantly wrestled with the question of the doctrine's application. Cort was
an attempt by the Supreme Court to provide an acceptable standard by
which to imply private causes of action. The Court's failure to decide the
proper weight attributable to each factor resulted in the Cort test being
applied so diversely that it encouraged unconstitutional judicial legislation. In an effort to keep all federal courts faithful to constitutional principles, the Court established a new standard in Touche Ross by limiting
their inquiry strictly to what Congress intended. Touche Ross indicates
that this inquiry can be answered only by clear statutory language or
strong legislative history. It seems likely that Touche Ross will be the
standard in future implication cases involving a federal statute, even
where the plaintiff is expressly granted a federal right. The reason for this
approach is that the Court's present majority seems to realize that the
Touche Ross standard will help prevent judicial legislation, discourage
unnecessary litigation, and promote consistency in lower federal courts.
The Court has reminded Congress that it is the task of the legislative
branch not only to make the law, but to make their intentions clearly
known as to who is able to bring a private action under the law. It is hoped
that Congress is prepared to meet this task.
William Francis Drewry Gallalee
overruling the courts and finding an implied remedy:
[N]othing we have said prevents Congress from creating a private right of action on
behalf of brokerage firm customers for losses arising from misstatements contained in
§ 17(a) reports. But if Congress intends those customers to have such a federal right
of action, it is well aware of how it may effectuate that intent.
99 S. Ct. at 2491.
143. Implication of Private Actions, supra note 21, at 375.
144. "[I1t is . . .the exclusive province of Congress . . .to formulate legislative policies
.
" TVA
.. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).

